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The Tendency of Hotel Rooms Division Managers to Create Budgetary Slack
Collin Ramdeen, Marcia Taylor, and Scott Lee
School of Resort and Hospitality Management, Florida Gulf Coast University, Fort Myers, FL
ABSTRACT
This study explores how the budgeting system impacts rooms department managers’ tendency to 
create budgetary slack. The results provide support for four hypotheses, specifically indicating that 
rooms department managers’ tendency to create budgetary slack does change with the setting and 
the way the budgeting system is implemented. The major practical implication of this study is that 
allowing rooms department managers to participate actively in the budgeting process seems to 
reduce their tendencies to create budgetary slack.
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1.0 Introduction
According to Elias and Etim (2017), a budgeting 
system is of critical importance to the survival of 
any business from start- ups to well- established 
organizations. In other words, a budgeting system 
aids in planning, directing, and controlling the 
actions that management must undertake in order 
to satisfy their customers and succeed in the market 
(Braun & Tietz, 2018). Schmidgall (2016) stated that 
the design and implementation of a budgeting sys-
tem may be authoritative (top-down approach) or 
participative (bottom-up approach). The participa-
tive budgeting process can have significant impact 
on the tendency to create budgetary slack or TCBS 
(Kahar, Rohman, & Chariri, 2016).
TCBS describes the practice of underestimating 
budgeted revenues, or overestimating budgeted 
costs, to make budgeted targets more easily achiev-
able (Mowen, Hansen, & Heitger, 2018). TCBS 
often occurs when budget variances (the differences 
between actual results and budgeted amounts) are 
used to evaluate the impact of performance partic-
ipation in strategic and tactical budgeting system 
(Azar, Rahmani, & Khadivar, 2016). Budgetary 
slack can be used by managers to safeguard against 
unexpected adverse circumstances and provide a 
safety margin to meet or exceed budgeted objectives 
(Kahar et al., 2016). Budgetary slack can also mislead 
top management regarding the true profit potential 
of the firm, which could lead to inefficient resource 
planning and allocation within the firm (Horngren, 
Datar, & Rajan, 2018). However, Azar, Rahmani, 
and Khadivar (2016) concluded that budgetary slack 
could have a negative, neutral, or positive impact on 
an organization’s overall budgeting system.
The objective of this study is to investigate TCBS 
within the hotel industry specifically in the rooms 
division, by using modified survey instruments 
developed by Onsi’s (1973) and Merchant’s (1985) 
studies on TCBS. These two researchers were pio-
neers in the study of budgetary slack. While Onsi 
(1973) found that budgetary slack was created 
because of pressure and the use of budgeted profit 
attainment as basic criterion in evaluating manag-
er’s performance, the Merchant (1985) study indi-
cated that the design and implementation of the 
budgeting system affects TCBS. Since the major-
ity of multi- unit hotels use a bottom-up approach 
(participative approach) in their budgeting system 
(Schmidgall, 2016), this study will examine TCBS 
based on this type of budgeting system.
This study used the modified Onsi (1973) and 
Merchant (1985) survey instruments (see Table 1 
uma-jhfm272.indd   85 11/20/19   5:09 PM
86 C. RAMDEEN ET AL.
and Appendix 1) so that the instruments were adapt-
able to the hotel industry rooms division. Merchant’s 
(1985) two measures of technology in manufactur-
ing settings was replaced with Lee, Baker, and Kan-
dampully’s (2003) two levels of technology applied 
in hotels: (1) in- room service integration and (2) 
managerial and operational level integration.
There were two major criticisms of the Onsi 
(1973) and Merchant (1985) studies. First, these 
studies did not use random sampling. Second, these 
studies were done in the manufacturing sector. This 
study overcomes these two major deficiencies of the 
Onsi (1973) and Merchant (1985) studies by doing 
the following: First, a stratified random sampling 
was used because it provides the theoretical support 
for the research design needed to effectively test the 
appropriate hypotheses developed (Kerlinger, 1986; 
Munro, 2005; Gravetter, 2018). Second, the study 
was conducted in the service sector, specifically the 
hotel rooms division.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 will explain the literature review 
associated with TCBS. Section 3 describes the 
research methodology that was used. Section 4 
explains the results. Section 5 presents the discus-
sion and conclusion of findings. Section 6 outlines 
the limitations and implications of the study.
2.0 Literature review and development of 
hypotheses
2.1 Budgeting and agency theory
The goal of a budgeting system is to achieve orga-
nizational objectives (Horngren et al., 2018). Since 
agents do not always give their best efforts in achiev-
ing organizational objectives (Merchant, 1981), bud-
geting systems need to parallel the goals of agents 
with those of principals. Management accounting 
researchers use the term “agents” to mean subor-
dinates, employees, or lower level managers, while 
“principals” are generally referred to as superiors, top 
management, or owner- manager. The usage of these 
terms depends on the information asymmetry in the 
budgeting process. This research will use the term 
“subordinate” for agent and “superior” for principal.
Agency theory and its diffusion (principal agent 
model) provide insights to the budgeting system 
(Ekanayake, 2004; Kahar et al., 2016). It is one of the 
most influential theories that underlies the majority 
of corporate governance and management control 
research (Covaleski, Evans, & Luft, 2003). Under-
lying agency theory is the assumption that agents 
are opportunistic and will always engage in self- 
serving behavior when opportunities arise (Ekanay-
ake, 2004). As a result, the role of the budgeting 
system (procedures, information, monitoring, per-
formance evaluation, rewards, and penalties) is to 
help the principals in controlling the opportunistic 
behavior of the agents by minimizing opportunities 
and incentives for this kind of behavior (Demski & 
Feltham, 1978).
Agency theory researchers (Demski & Feltham, 
1978; Baiman, 1982; Covaleski et al., 2003) refer 
to budgetary slack as “improved employees wel-
fare relative to budgeting practice,” “dysfunctional 
behavior,” “excess consumption of perquisites,” 
and “tendency to shirk.” Organizational behav-
ior researchers (Schein, 1979) and management 
accounting researchers (Cammann, 1976; Ekanay-
ake, 2004; Mowen et al., 2018), on the other hand, 
Table 1. Variables and Instruments Used for  
Measuring Them
Variables Measurements Items Likert 
type scale
Dependent variable Onsi (1973) 4 Five point
Tendency to create slack
Independent variables
Importance of meeting 
budgets
Required exploration of 
variance
Merchant 
(1985)
4 Five point
Reaction to budget 
overruns
Merchant 
(1985)
3 Five point
Linked with intrinsic 
reward
Merchant 
(1985)
5 Five point
Participation
Influence on budget plan Merchant 
(1985)
2 Five point
Involvement in budgeting Merchant 
(1985)
3 Five point
Technology
In- room service 
integration
Merchant 
(1985)
Lee et al. 
(2003)
2 Five point
Managerial and 
operational level
Merchant 
(1985)
Lee et al. 
(2003)
1 Five point
Slack defection Onsi (1973) 3 Five point
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refer to budgetary slack as “loose budget standards,” 
“a lack of goal congruence,” “managerial biasing,” 
“defensive tactical responses,” “deceptive behaviors,” 
and “padding the budget.”
Regardless of the description, TCBS is a manage-
rial trait. It is a major component of the utility func-
tion that a manager will try to maximize (Cyert & 
March, 1963). TCBS is guided by a manager’s own 
self- interest (Baiman, 1982).
2.2 Tendency to create budgetary slack and 
meeting budgeting targets
Empirical studies by Miller (1975); Heneman, 
Schwab, Fossum, and Dryer (1980); and Yulian-
syah, Inapty, Dahlan, and Agtia (2018) inferred 
that the use of financial rewards motivates employ-
ees to act in their own self- interest. Cherington 
and Cherington (1973) examined the characteris-
tics of a reward structure as reinforcement in the 
relationship between budgetary participation and 
performance. They discovered that a reward struc-
ture based on budget achievement represents an 
appropriate reinforcement for the participants in 
the budgetary process. Therefore, when budget per-
formance is associated with a company’s reward 
system, employees are motivated to introduce bud-
getary slack into their operating budget (Kren, 1992; 
Dunk, 1993; Yuen, 2004; Yuliansyah et al., 2018).
Prior researchers (Kenis, 1979; Dunk, 1993; Kahar 
et al., 2016) have identified the pressure of not meet-
ing budgetary goals as another significant factor 
contributing to the development of budgetary slack. 
The budgeting process puts pressure on individuals 
to meet their budgetary commitment, which in turn 
leads to the creation of budgetary slack (Kenis, 1979; 
Kahar et al., 2016). Therefore, it is likely that TCBS 
will increase the pressure on individuals to meet 
budgetary requirements.
According to Merchant (1985), managers may 
have the TCBS; however, the TCBS can be aug-
mented or diminished by the way in which the bud-
geting system is designed and implemented. The 
following researchers also provide additional checks 
and balances used to reduce TCBS. Brownell (1982) 
stated that budgetary participation enables super-
visors to devise an effective remuneration scheme 
with a unified goal that encourages subordinates 
to achieve budgetary objectives and reduce TCBS. 
Merchant and Manzoni (1989) research showed that 
superiors used budget monitoring to exercise con-
trol, implement decisions, and facilitate continuous 
improvement with their subordinates in order to 
check and reduce TCBS. According to Van der Stede 
(2003), budgetary communication can enhance 
the overall efficiency of organizational operations 
and provide additional checks and balances used 
to reduce TCBS. Finally, Otley (1978) found that a 
strong budget emphasis by superiors on the budget 
leads to higher budget accuracy and reduces dys-
functional behavior (TCBS) by subordinates.
Onsi (1973) found a positive relationship between 
managers’ needs to create budgetary slack and an 
authoritarian, top- management budgetary control 
system. Onsi (1973) said that this type of system 
places heavy stress on achieving budget targets. 
Cammann (1976) studied the effects of different 
styles and uses of control systems that were cate-
gorized as “defensive subordinate responses,” and 
obtained results consistent with Onsi (1973). Mur-
ray (1990) and Davis, DeZoort, and Kopp (2006) 
found that when organizations set budget targets 
on which managerial compensation was based, the 
organization faced more serious dysfunctional con-
sequences from managerial manipulation. Based 
on these prior findings, the following hypothesis is 
presented.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship 
between managers’ tendency to create 
budgetary slack and the importance placed on 
meeting budget targets.
2.3 Budgetary participation
Organizations vary in the degree and form of man-
agement participation in their budgeting processes. 
Agency theorists suggest that the demand for par-
ticipative budgeting arises because various parties 
(agents and principals, and central and local man-
agement) engaged in the budgeting process have 
differential information about uncertainty (Baiman, 
1982; Baiman & Evans, 1983). The agency theory 
assumes that there is a significant reason for partic-
ipative budgeting based on the transfer of informa-
tion from a subordinate to a superior and that there 
are potential gains for both parties (Young, 1985; 
Yuliansyah et al., 2018; Kahar et al., 2016).
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The likelihood of injecting budgetary slack tends 
to increase if managers perceive that they can par-
ticipate in the formulation of the budget (Mowen 
et al., 2018). Mowen et al. (2018) explained that the 
participation of managers in the budgetary process 
plays a vital role in the development of budgetary 
slack. Onsi (1973) and Merchant (1985) found a 
negative correlation between the participation of 
managers in the budgeting process and the oppor-
tunities to create budgetary slack. Likewise, Cam-
mann (1976) found that allowing subordinates to 
participate in the budgetary process reduced a range 
of behaviors including defensiveness and budgetary 
slack creation. Therefore, the following hypothesis 
was developed.
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship 
between the managers’ tendency to create 
budgetary slack and the extent of participation 
allowed in the budgeting process.
2.4 Technology application and predictability
Prior research on the benefits of technology in 
service organizations suggests that technology 
enhances service quality: Reid and Sandler (1992), 
Bitner, Brown, and Meuter (2000), Bilgihan, Oku-
mus, Nusair, and Kwun (2011), and Zhu and 
Morosan (2014); improves efficiency, effectiveness, 
productivity, and convenience: Nykiel (2001), and 
Beldona and Cobanoglu (2007); strengthens the 
customer- firm relationship: Reichheld (1996); ele-
vates the quality- value- loyalty chain and creates a 
competitive advantage: Porter (2001) and Bilgihan 
et al. (2011); assists customers and improves the 
skills of the employees within the service organiza-
tion: Blumberg (1994), Siguaw and Enz (1999), and 
Bilgihan et al. (2011).
The hotel industry has been transformed from 
a traditional hands- on approach, and low- tech 
industry into a high- touch and high- tech industry, 
effectively utilizing technology for the benefit of cus-
tomers, employees, and hotels (Lee et al., 2003; Zhu 
& Morosan, 2014). Technology plays an important 
role in customer- oriented hotels through commu-
nication, recognition, and evaluation of custom-
ers (Bilgihan et al., 2011). According to Lee et al. 
(2003) technologies are applied at two principal lev-
els in hotels: (1) for in- room (guest room) services 
integration and (2) at the managerial and opera-
tional level integration. These two levels of tech-
nologies were included the survey instrument (see 
Table 1 and Appendix 1).
Guest- room service technologies include, but are 
not limited to, multiple telephone lines, electronic 
meal ordering, self- checkout and self- wakeup sys-
tems, in- room business services, electronic and 
video entertainment services (Bilgihan, Smith, 
Ricci, & Bujisic, 2016). These technologies have 
improved in- room services, widened choices in 
entertainment, and increased the hotels profitability 
(Jung, Kim, & Farrish, 2014). Localities and the type 
of customers determine the degree to which hotels 
make these services available to their guests (Jung et 
al., 2014). Hotels whose customers consists of busi-
ness travelers are more likely to equip their rooms 
with advanced in- room technologies as opposed to 
hotels in more remote or in resort locations (Lee et 
al., 2003).
According to Espino- Rodrıguez and Gil- Padilla 
(2015), at the managerial and operational level, 
technology impacts several functional areas such 
as marketing (using the internet), accounting (cash 
receipts and disbursements), and rooms operation 
(customer service and response time). Technology 
can increase efficiencies in service delivery that ben-
efit the customers (Blumberg, 1994). Property man-
agement systems (PMS) are commonly used in front 
office, room service, and accounting to assist with 
interconnectivity and decision- making (Pucciani & 
Murphy, 2011). Also, the global distribution system 
(GDS), central reservation system (CRS), and the 
internet provide customers with more efficient res-
ervation procedures. These systems improve inter-
action between intermediaries and the hotels to 
obtain important information regarding their cus-
tomers (Lee et al., 2003).
The two major levels of technologies impacting 
the hotel rooms divisions are as follows: (1) for in- 
room services integration and (2) at the managerial 
and operational level integration. Therefore, these 
two levels of technologies were used in this study to 
evaluate the relationship between technologies pre-
diction and TCBS.
Research on organizational behavior character-
izes and measures technology in a single dimension 
known as “task predictability” (Fry, 1982). Mer-
chant (1985) suggested that it seems logical that 
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technological predictability could be systematically 
related to the TCBS. Based on prior research (Cyert 
& March, 1963) suggesting that budgetary slack can 
be used to absorb uncertainty, Merchant (1985) pro-
posed that slack could provide freedom from short- 
term commitment that could be used effectively to 
deal with a lack of predictability. Therefore, Mer-
chant (1985) suggested that there could be a neg-
ative relation between technological predictability 
and the TCBS. Therefore, the following hypothesis 
is presented.
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relation 
between the degree of predictability of 
technology and the tendency of managers to 
create budgetary slack.
2.5 The ability to detect budgetary slack
The extent to which an organization is decentral-
ized is a possible source that could affect superiors’ 
ability to detect budgetary slack incorporated into 
the budget by subordinates (Schiff & Lewin, 1970). 
Schiff and Lewin (1970) reported that in decentral-
ized companies, managers’ TCBS was influenced 
by their perception of top management’s ability to 
detect budgetary slack. Managers in decentralized 
environments tended to create budgetary slack 
through practices such as underestimating gross 
revenues and including discretionary increases in 
expenditures (Horngren et al., 2018). The amount of 
budgetary slack created by decentralized managers 
is likely to be related to the level of decentralization 
in the organization relative to the superiors’ ability 
to detect budgetary slack (Horngren et al., 2018).
Merchant (1985) stated that the ability (or lack 
thereof) of superiors to detect slack may also influ-
ence their subordinates’ tendencies to create bud-
getary slack. After reviewing cognitive dissonance 
theory (Brehm & Cohen, 1962), balance theory 
(Heider, 1958), and congruity theory (Osgood & 
Tannenbaum, 1955), Merchant (1985) suggested 
that there is a negative relation between a superior’s 
ability to detect budgetary slack and a subordinate’s 
tendency to create it. From the above information 
presented, the following hypothesis is stated.
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship 
between superiors’ ability to detect budgetary 
slack and the tendency of managers to create 
budgetary slack.
To test these hypotheses, an appropriate survey 
instrument was developed. The survey instrument 
was a modified version of Onsi (1973) and Mer-
chant’s (1985) survey instrument. The next section 
presents the methodology used to obtain the rele-
vant data for analysis.
3.0 Methodology
3.1 Pretest
To ensure that the questionnaire was appropri-
ate, a pretest using faculty and hotel managers was 
conducted. This was done to minimize potential 
problems that could affect the respondents’ under-
standing of the questions presented. Based on 
the pretest, a number of items were reworded to 
improve clarification and consistency in the mailed 
questionnaire.
3.2 Sampling
A stratified random sample of 600 hotels was selected 
from the American Hotel and Lodging Association 
(AHLA) listing of 1,800 largest hotels. After con-
sultation with two accounting and one finance pro-
fessor with expert knowledge on survey research, 
a population of 1,800 of the largest hotels were 
selected. According to Bullock and Bakay (1980), 
large hotels would have more organized “state of the 
art” budgeting systems. Therefore, selecting a popu-
lation of 1,800 of the largest hotels to take a stratified 
random sample of 600 hotels would provide greater 
assurance that the hotels selected do have a formal 
budgeting system.
A stratified random sample of 600 participants is 
consistent with Ozer and Yilmaz (2011) research. A 
stratified random sampling is superior to a simple 
random sampling because the process of stratifying 
reduces sample errors and ensures a greater level of 
representation (Gravetter, 2018). This allowed each 
of the listed hotels an equal chance of being selected 
to ensure as far as possible that the sample was rep-
resentative of the population of hotel organizations 
(Kerlinger, 1986). This sampling design gives the-
oretical support to adequately test the hypotheses. 
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For each hotel selected, a questionnaire with a cover 
letter and prepaid self- addressed envelope was 
mailed to the Rooms Department Manager. A total 
of 600 questionnaires were mailed. Two follow- up 
letters were mailed to improve the response rate 
(Dillman, 1978). The second follow- up responses 
received were used to test for a nonresponse bias. 
There was no significant difference between early 
and late respondents.
3.3 Measurement and validity of constructs
Tendency to create budgetary slack (TCBS)
Managers’ tendency to create budgetary slack was 
measured by using a modified four- item five- point 
Likert- scaled instrument developed by Onsi (1973). 
This instrument is an established scale that focuses 
on subordinates’ attitude toward slack creation (see 
Table 1 and Appendix 1). Responses were scored 
on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). The instrument relies upon managers’ per-
ceptions of the level of slack in their budgets. For 
example, “submit budget requests that are safely 
attained.” The Cronbach alpha reported by Onsi 
(1973) was 0.70. Prior studies (Nouri & Parker, 
1996; Lai, Dunk, & Smith, 1996) using the Onsi 
(1973) instrument reported Cronbach alphas of 0.75 
and 0.74, respectively.
Importance of meeting the budget
Merchant (1985) used three scaled instruments to 
measure the importance of meeting the budget, 
and these instruments were employed in this study 
(see Table 1 and Appendix 1). The first instrument 
“required an explanation of variances” using four 
five- point Likert- scaled items. The second instru-
ment measured reactions to “expected budget over-
runs” using a three item five- point Likert- scaled 
measurement. The third instrument measured the 
budget’s link with “extrinsic rewards” on a modified 
five- item five- point Likert- scaled instrument. Mer-
chant (1985) reported Cronbach alphas for the three 
instruments described above of 0.84, 0.72, and 0.79, 
respectively.
Budgetary participation
Budgetary participation was measured using a mod-
ified Merchant’s (1985) instrument. “Influence on 
budget plans” was measured using two five- point 
Likert- scaled items, while “personal involvement in 
budgeting process” was measured using three five- 
point Likert- scaled items (see Table 1 and Appendix 
1). Merchant (1985) reported the Cronbach alpha for 
influence on the budget plans and personal involve-
ment in budgeting as 0.52 and 0.60, respectively.
Technology
The two measures of technology evaluated in the 
hotel rooms division are as follows: (1) in- room 
service integration and (2) managerial and opera-
tional level integration. The in- room service inte-
gration measures require respondents to indicate on 
two zero- to- five scales the degree of automation of 
their rooms division and the class their most auto-
mated rooms division equipment falls within, rang-
ing from manual machines to self- measuring and 
computer- controlled equipment (see Table 1 and 
Appendix 1). The scale scores were total to derive 
an overall score for the measures (Price, 1972). The 
positive correlation (r = 0. 673, p < 0.001) between 
the two scales provides the support to allow them to 
be added (Brownell, 1986). The managerial opera-
tional level of service integration was measured on 
a modified Merchant (1985) five- point Likert scale 
anchored by (1) low service integration and (5) high 
service integration.
Slack detection
The ability to detect budgetary slack was measured 
using a modified three- item five- point Likert- scale 
instrument developed by Onsi (1973). This instru-
ment was also used by Merchant (1985). The Cron-
bach alpha value reported by Merchant (1985) was 
0.61. The Onsi (1973) modified three- item five- 
point Likert- scale instrument is in Appendix 1.
4.0 Results
A total of 168 responses were received. Twelve 
responses were incomplete and therefore not usable, 
leaving a total of 156 usable responses, representing 
a 26% response rate. This response rate is consistent 
with survey research (Childers, Pride, & Ferrell, 
1980). The respondents on average had held their 
current position for 4.23 years, and their average 
age was 36.4 years. Table 2 shows the property size 
distribution based on usable responses. Hotels with 
less than 500 rooms were classified as small, while 
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those with 500 or more rooms were categorized as 
large (Ramdeen, 2001; Ramdeen, Santos, & Chat-
field, 2011). The t- test for size of the properties on 
the TCBS was not significant.
Table 2 illustrates the descriptive statistics of 
the variables measured. A reliability check using 
Cronbach alpha (Cronbach, 1951) was done to test 
the consistency of the budgetary slack constructs. 
Results from the nine constructs show the Cronbach 
alpha coefficient ranging from 0.74 to 0.86. Accord-
ing to Nunnally (1978), Cronbach alpha coefficients 
of 0.50 to .60 are acceptable. Table 3 shows the 
results from testing all four hypotheses. The correla-
tion coefficient r shows the mathematical relation-
ship that exists between the dependent variable (the 
tendency to create budgetary slack) and each of the 
eight independent variables. Cohen (1988) defines 
a small effect as a correlation coefficient, r, equal to 
0.10; a moderate effect as r equal to 0.30; and a large 
effect as r equal 0.50. The results in Table 3 show a 
strong moderate effect for the correlation coefficient 
(r) for eight independent variables.
Hypothesis 1 tested the importance of meeting the 
budget and the tendency to create budgetary slack. 
Results in Table 4 indicated that that there is strong 
support for Hypothesis 1. The correlation between 
the tendency to create budgetary slack and each of 
the variables measuring the importance of meeting 
the budget is significant and positive at p < 0.01 and 
p < 0.05 one- tailed test. These results are consistent 
with the theoretical expectations from the literature.
Hypothesis 2 deals with budgetary participa-
tion and the tendency to create budgetary slack. 
The results in Table 4 illustrate that the tendency 
to create budgetary slack is negatively or inversely 
related to the extent of participation allowed in the 
budgetary process. The two participation variables 
are significant and have a negative correlation with 
the tendency to create budgetary slack. Therefore, 
results from Hypothesis 2 are in accordance with lit-
erature expectations.
Hypothesis 3 indicated that the tendency to create 
budgetary slack is negatively related to the predict-
ability of the hotel technology process. As shown in 
Table 4, both variables (in- room technology service 
integration and managerial and operational level 
technology integration) are negatively related to 
managers’ tendency to create budgetary slack.
Hypothesis 4 stated that superiors’ ability to detect 
slack is negatively related to managers’ tendency to 
create budgetary slack. The correlation presented in 
Table 4 is significant and negative, indicating sup-
port for this hypothesis.
5.0 Discussion
The purpose of this study was to provide some 
empirical evidence about how the design and imple-
mentation of a hotel organization’s budgeting system 
might affect rooms division managers’ tendencies to 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Study
Variable n Mean S.D. Theoretical Range Actual Range Cronb. alpha
Min Max Min Max
1. Tendency to create slack 156 10.26 3.79 4 20 4 20 0.82
2. Importance of meeting budget
Required explanation of variances 156 13.96 4.64 4 20 4 20 0.86
Reactions to budget overruns 156 6.91 2.93 3 15 3 15 0.74
Link with extrinsic rewards 156 16.17 4.84 5 25 5 25 0.80
3. Participation
Influence on budget plans 156 7.87 2.71 2 10 2 10 0.78
Involvement in budgeting 156 12.53 2.91 3 15 3 15 0.80
4. Technology
In- room service integration 156 10.07 3.61 2 10 2 10 0.77
Managerial and operational level 
integration
156 9.93 3.57 1 5 1 5 0.75
5. Slack detection 156 12.18 2.83 3 15 3 15 0.81
Table 2. Property Size Distribution
Size (number of rooms) Frequency Percentage
Under 500 74 47
500– 749 47 30
750– 999 18 12
1000– 1249 11 7
1250 and over 6 4
Total 156 100
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create budgetary slack. Unlike Merchant’s (1985) 
study, which was drawn from convenient sam-
ples obtained from the manufacturing sector and 
focused on the functional area of production, this 
study focused on managers in the functional area of 
hotel rooms operation in relationship to budgetary 
slack creation.
Merchant (1985) concluded that the TCBS is a 
general characteristic of managers. This tendency, 
according to Merchant (1985), can be affected 
both positively and negatively depending on the 
way in which the budgeting systems are designed 
and implemented. To be specific, Merchant (1985) 
examined managers TCBS in relationship to the 
administrative systems of organizations. Merchant 
(1985) examined four hypotheses and found very 
little support for them. The first hypothesis, that the 
propensity of managers to create budgetary slack is 
positively related to the importance placed on meet-
ing budget targets, was not supported. The second 
hypothesis, that the propensity of managers to cre-
ate budgetary slack is negatively related to the extent 
of participation, received marginal support. The 
third hypothesis, that the propensity of managers 
to create budgetary slack is negatively related to the 
degree of predictability in the production process, 
obtained very little support. The fourth hypothesis, 
that the propensity to create slack and the ability 
of superiors to detect it are negatively associated, 
received mixed results. Even though the literature 
review strongly supports the theory underlying 
Merchant’s (1985) hypotheses, he received mixed 
results. Merchant (1985) suggested that the mixed 
results of his findings may be attributed to the fact 
that he used nonrandom sampling in his research.
This study used stratified random sampling. 
Therefore, the results of this study provide support 
for all four hypotheses presented. The results are 
consistent with the literature review’s expectations. 
Although there is no evidence to suggest that strat-
ified random sampling is the factor that enabled 
the results of this study to be consistent with those 
expectations, there is a strong theoretical basis for 
employing stratified random sampling in hypothesis 
testing (Kerlinger, 1986). The findings presented in 
this study indicate empirical support for hotel room 
operations that are generalizable within the hotel 
industry, but not outside of it.
The results indicate that managers’ TCBS does 
change with the setting and depending on how 
the budgeting system is implemented (importance 
of meeting the budget). Therefore, the TCBS does 
seem to be increased by the imposition of a formal 
budgeting process. However, allowing managers to 
participate actively in the budgeting processes seems 
to reduce their tendencies to create budgetary slack.
Technological predictability also has negative 
impact on the tendencies to create budgetary slack. 
The results suggest that technology may interact with 
the way in which a budgeting system is employed. 
With respect to participation, it may reduce subor-
dinates’ tendencies to create budgetary slack in set-
tings that are relatively predictable (ie., a bottom- up 
approach). Finally, superiors’ ability to detect slack 
also seems to have strong negative effects on subor-
dinates’ tendencies to create budgetary slack.
6.0 Limitations and implications
This study has some limitations. First, the study 
examines the rooms division managers’ tendency to 
create budgetary slack in hotel organizations (ser-
vice sector). Due to differences between the service 
sectors and manufacturing sectors, the general-
ization of this study’s results to the manufacturing 
sectors will not give accurate results. Therefore, gen-
eralizability of findings should be considered in this 
context (hotels rooms divisions managers).
Table 4. Correlation Results from Testing Hypotheses 1, 2, 
3, and 4
Correlation of tendency to create 
budgetary slack with:
r p- value
Hypothesis 1: Importance of meeting 
budget
 Required explanation of variances 0.448 0.005**
 Reactions to expected budget overruns 0.399 0.001*
 Link with extrinsic rewards 0.389 0.001*
Hypothesis 2: Participation
 Influence on budget plans – 0.297 0.010***
 Personal involvement in budgeting – 0.332 0.005**
Hypothesis 3: Technology
 In- room service integration – 0.381 0.001*
 Managerial and operational level 
integration
– 0.288 0.010*
Hypothesis 4: Ability to detect slack
 Slack detection – 0.336 0.005**
Note: One- tailed significance: * p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; and *** p < 
0.10.
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Second, this study only investigates the effect of 
importance placed on meeting budget targets, bud-
getary participation, technology applications and 
predictability, and the ability to detect budgetary 
slack on managers’ tendency to create budgetary 
slack. However, there are other factors (see Future 
Research) that could affect the tendency to create 
budgetary slack that are excluded from the study. 
Third, although the data was collected from stratified 
random samples of rooms managers, the findings are 
limited to the functional area of the rooms depart-
ment within the hotel industry. Fourth, a possible 
inherent limitation is that managers do not always 
want to give information or sometimes give incorrect 
information related to the budget in the field of their 
responsibility when filling out survey instruments.
Regardless of these limitations, the results from 
this study show evidence of conditions that could 
influence the creation of budgetary slack in the hotel 
rooms division. Also, the results show significant 
statistical support for all four hypotheses. This study 
contributes to the literature on budgetary slack and 
suggests how budgetary slack might be controlled if 
the ability of superiors to detect it is improved.
These results have potentially important practi-
cal implications for top management dealing with 
indiscriminate levels of budgetary slack. The follow-
ing are proactive approaches with which top man-
agement could reduce TCBS. First, top management 
could invest in better information systems, provid-
ing closer supervision, and/or by using more fre-
quent or more thorough operational audits. Second, 
top management could use external benchmark 
(i.e., the STAR Program Benchmarking Reports at 
https://www.strglobal.com/products/star- program 
with Key Performance Indicators provides excellent 
external benchmarking on the global hotel industry 
and can be obtained daily, weekly, monthly, quar-
terly, and annually for an annual subscription fee) 
performance measures to reduce a manager’s ability 
to set budget levels that are easy to achieve.
Third, top management could be regularly 
involved in understanding what their subordinate 
managers are doing and mentoring them. Fourth, 
part of top management’s responsibility is to pro-
mote commitment among the employees to a set 
of core values and norms. These values and norms 
describe what constitutes acceptable and unaccept-
able behavior. Fifth, top management could design 
innovative performance evaluation measures that 
reward subordinate managers based on the subse-
quent accuracy of the forecasts used in preparing 
budgets.
While the majority of the empirical literature has 
interpreted budgetary slack as being dysfunctional 
to companies’ operations, practitioners can use 
budgetary slack in a meaningful manner to bene-
fit their organization. Budgetary slack can be use-
ful if incorporated into the budgeting system using 
underlying management accounting assumptions. 
For example, when a hotel is faced with uncer-
tainty and several short- term objectives, budgetary 
slack can enable managers to be more focused and 
motivated because of the availability of additional 
financial resources. Therefore, budgetary slack can 
provide managers with a hedge against unexpected 
adverse circumstances. However, budgetary slack 
should not convey misleading information to top 
management because it would destroy the integrity 
and effectiveness of the budgeting system. There-
fore, subordinates using budgetary slack must hold 
“honest” communication between themselves and 
their bosses.
7.0 Future research
This research covers only the rooms division man-
agers’ tendency to create budgetary slack. Future 
studies could examine the tendency to create bud-
getary slack in other function areas of hotels, such as 
food and beverage, marketing, accounting/finance, 
recreation, and facilities management. Also, this 
study used agency theory to provide explanation 
for managers’ tendency to create budgetary slack. 
Future research could examine attribution theory, 
cognitive theory, contingency theory, and motiva-
tional theory.
Budgetary slack is an important area of research 
in management and behavioral accounting. There 
are several variables of interest that could affect 
managers tendency to create budgetary slack in 
the hotel industry. Therefore, future research could 
examine the following factors’ impact on budgetary 
slack in the hotel industry: information asymmetry, 
budget emphasis, ethical work climate, environ-
mental uncertainty, and job satisfaction.
Although empirical researchers (Kren, 1992; 
Dunk, 1993; Yuen, 2004; Yuliansyah et al., 2018) 
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suggested that there are considerable opportuni-
ties and reasons for subordinates to build slack into 
their budgets, factors such as task and environmen-
tal uncertainty may underscore the utility of slack 
as being organizationally functional in responding 
to these factors. Even though the primary motiva-
tion for slack creation may be self- interest (Schiff 
& Lewin, 1970; Ozer & Yilmaz, 2011), its usage 
may take place in many ways that are beneficial to 
the organization (Dunk, 1993). Therefore, further 
research could be undertaken to investigate the link 
between budgetary slack creation and its subsequent 
utilization.
Since there are potential factors provided that 
may impact whether subordinates build slack into 
their budgets, there are opportunities for future 
research to be done to provide evidence of whether 
these factors do affect budgetary slack as stipulated.
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Appendix 1
Measurement instrument (survey) used to test 
hypothesis
Onsi (1973) modified to measure the tendency to 
create budgetary slack
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with 
each statement by CIRCLING a number from 1 to 5 
based on scale provided.
1. As a manager, to protect myself, I submit budget 
requests that can safely be attained.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
2. As a manager, I usually set two types performance 
standards: one between myself and my subordi-
nates, and another standard between myself and 
my superiors, to be safe.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
3. In good business times, my superior will accept a 
reasonable level of excess resources in my budget.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
4. Padding the budget is good to do things that can-
not be officially approved.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
Merchant (1985) modified to measure impor-
tance of meeting budgets (required exploration 
of variance)
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with 
each statement by CIRCLING a number from 1 to 5 
based on scale provided.
1. My explanation of budget variances is included in 
my performance reports.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
2. I investigate favorable as well as unfavorable bud-
get variances for my rooms division.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
3. I am required to submit an explanation in writing 
about causes of large budget variances.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
4. I am required to report actions I take to correct 
causes of budget variances.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
Merchant (1985) modified to measure impor-
tance of meeting budgets (reaction to budget 
overruns)
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with 
each statement by CIRCLING a number from 1 to 5 
based on scale provided.
1. My superior calls me in to discuss variations from 
my budget.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
2. My superior expresses dissatisfaction to me about 
results in my rooms division when the budget has 
not been met.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
3. My superior mentions budgets when talking 
to me about my efficiency as a rooms division 
manager.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
Merchant (1985) modified to measure impor-
tance of meeting budgets (linked with intrinsic 
rewards)
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with 
each statement by CIRCLING a number from 1 to 5 
based on scale provided.
1. Performing job tasks that are critical to the over-
all success of the hotel organization.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
2. The opportunity to use all of my knowledge, 
skills, and abilities on the job.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
3. Solving major work- related problems in the 
rooms division.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
4. The ability to have more control over the rooms 
department operations.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
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5. The chance to be in a position of leadership within 
the hotel organization.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
Merchant (1985) modified to measure participa-
tion (influence on budget plan)
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with 
each statement by CIRCLING a number from 1 to 5 
based on scale provided.
1. I have adequate information to make optimal deci-
sions to accomplish my performance objectives.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
2. I am able to obtain the strategic information nec-
essary to evaluate important decision alternatives.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
Merchant (1985) modified to measure participa-
tion (involvement in budget)
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with 
each statement by CIRCLING a number from 1 to 5 
based on scale provided.
1. I am involved in setting all portions of my budget.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
2. My budget is not final until I am satisfied with it.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
3. My opinion is an important factor in setting my 
budget.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
Merchant (1985) and Lee et al. (2003) modi-
fied to measure technology (in- room service 
integration)
Please indicate the extent of automation with each 
statement by CIRCLING a number from 0 to 5 
based on scale provided.
1. The degree of automation of the rooms division.
 No Automation 0— 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 High Degree 
of Automation
2. The class your most automated rooms division 
equipment falls within ranging from manual, 
machines to self- measuring and computer con-
trol equipment.
 No Automation 0— 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 High Degree 
of Automation
Merchant (1985) and Lee et al. (2003) modified 
to measure technology (managerial and opera-
tional level)
Please indicate the extent of service integration by 
CIRCLING a number from 1 to 5 based on scale 
provided.
1. The levels of managerial operational service 
integration.
 Low Service Integration 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 High Ser-
vice Integration
Onsi (1973) modified to measure budgetary slack 
detection
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with 
each statement by CIRCLING a number from 1 to 5 
based on scale provided.
1. My superior has enough information to deter-
mine if I include excess resources in my budget.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
2. My superior receives detailed information on the 
activities and resources consumed in my area of 
responsibility.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
3. My superior has means of detecting if I include 
excess resources in my budget.
 Strongly Disagree 1— 2— 3— 4— 5 Strongly Agree
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